









Bank Technical Note 8
Violence Control at the
Municipal Level1
Comparative Advantages of Municipal Violence Prevention Programs
Municipal management of violence prevention and assistance program implementation provides a number of
comparative advantages: Locally-managed programs:
Make it possible to obtain the input and involvement of a broader range of people and institutions in exam-
ining the problem, achieve agreements and delineate responsibilities.
Make it easier to coordinate the different agencies involved in prevention and assistance efforts, which has
been one of the main stumbling blocks to the success of nationwide programs.
Make it possible to gather reliable information and statistics on different aspects of the problem for specific
geographical areas, which in turn helps to efficiently assign investment between control and prevention
activities.
Cost less than national programs.
Facilitate follow up and evaluation of actions undertaken to address the problem.
1 This Technical Note was prepared by Rodrigo Guerrero Velazco M.D., Ph.D., of the Carvajal Foundation in Colombia, ex Cali Mayor.
2 Uruguay followed Colombia as the second country to request and obtain aid from the Inter-American Development Bank to design a
Citizen Security program (Loan UR-118). A 1999 survey conducted for the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in Costa
Rica showed that 51% of the people surveyed considered the lack of safety on the streets to be the main problem the country was facing.
Surveys conducted by LatinoBarómetro in 17 countries
of the region during 1996 showed that people per-
ceived violence as the number one social and economic
problem in Latin America (Londoño and Guerrero,
1999). Crime prevention, public safety, and violence
control have become high priority issues on the agenda
of community activists and local government, not only
in countries with high crime rates, such as Colombia
or El Salvador, but also in countries with compara-
tively lower rates, such as Uruguay and Costa Rica.2
Since violence and the lack of public safety are, for the
most part, determined by factors that are common to a
whole nation or an entire region, solutions to these
problems require action to be taken on the national or
regional level. Nevertheless, these phenomena take
place and are felt on the local or municipal level; there-
fore, pressure for control measures is brought to bear
on local government, i.e. on mayors or other municipal
authorities. In many countries of the region, a wide-
spread trend towards decentralization of government
administration has led to the delegation of government
functions and the allocation of resources to local gov-
ernment. This trend has also given rise to greater pres-
sure on mayors and others municipal authorities to ad-
dress these issues on the local level.
It is not surprising that several cities of the region have
set up crime prevention programs on their own initia-
tive. Colombia is a prime example of such initiatives:
the cities of Cali, Medellin, and Bogota, applied and
obtained a loan to finance public safety and violence
prevention programs. Although the loans to these mu-
nicipalities is guarantied by the national government,
the loan was obtain and will be repaid by the three cit-
ies. Another successful example of these initiatives is a
program run by the city of Boston (see Table 8).
This technical note builds upon and complements the
other notes in the series. This note presents violence
prevention programs from a local perspective and pro-
vides some examples of actions that have been taken
by municipal authorities in different parts of the
Americas.2
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Table 2.
Deaths by External Causes. Río de Janeiro, 1995
January-March          Octuber-December
    Number    Porcentage    Number    Porcentage
Homicides 760 32.8 1021 50.2
Suicides 4 0.2 39         1.9
Accidents 333 14.4 787 38.7
Cause unknow 1219 52.6       188         9.2
2316 100.0 2035 100.0
Source: Secretariat of Health, Rio de Janeiro 1996
Conceptual Model
No single model is universally accepted for the classifi-
cation and study of crime prevention and public safety
intervention programs. Nonetheless, no matter how
these programs are classified, whether it is using the
system outlined in Technical Note 3 or the classifica-
tion recently proposed by the World Bank (Moser,
1999), there is no denying that a risk factor identifica-
tion-based model is a practical and simple approach
which has been successfully utilized in several in-
stances. References to this model will be made through-
out this note.
It is important to stress that no single risk factor can ac-
count for violence in a particular place. Many times, a
wide variety of factors can be in play at the same time
in any given context; these factors can include, for ex-
ample, an inefficient judicial system, lack of employ-
ment opportunities for youth, or alcohol use and
firearm possession (see Technical Note 3). Violence is
the result of the interaction of several factors.
It is also important to bear in mind that risk factors can
vary widely from one country to another and even from
one city to another within the same country and, there-
fore, must always be identified within the specific con-
text of the place where action is to be taken. Even
though many risk factors are common to many places
and cities, a single solution cannot be applied to ad-
dress all of these factors, nor can one solution be effec-
tive in each and every context.
The Key Role of Information
In order for a risk factor strategy to be properly and ef-
fectively applied, a timely and reliable statistical report-
ing system must be in place to make it possible to
identify and quantify incidents of violence and the risk
factors that contribute to such incidents. Nevertheless,
statistical information on violence in the region is usu-
ally sketchy at best, and this greatly limits the success
of risk factor strategies. The major obstacles to proper
reporting are listed below:
Inconsistencies in definitions. Even though homi-
cide may seem to be a simple concept to define, in
reality, it can entail great complexity. For example,
in the United States, statistics on homicide rates
show a 9% difference between Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation (FBI) figures and the number of death
certificates processed by the Center for Disease Con-
trol (CDC). The basic reason for the difference lies
in the fact that the FBI does not count as homicides
any deaths resulting from application of the death
penalty or confrontations with law enforcement au-
thorities. The CDC, however, counts deaths result-
ing from either of these sources as homicides
(Roberston, 1992).
Inconsistencies stemming from improper
classification or poor data quality. The following
table shows changes in causes of violent deaths in
Rio de Janeiro [over the course of a year], during
which time the accuracy in the reporting of deaths
improved as a result of a political-administrative
decision.
A cursory look at this table would lead one to believe
that the number of accidents, suicides and homicides
increased during the second half of the year in Rio de
Janeiro. However, what really happened was that the
quality of the statistics improved and many deaths that
would have been counted under the category of ‘Cause
unknown’ during the first quarter were counted under
one of the other categories during the four quarter.
Consequently, the category of ‘Cause Unknown’
dropped from 53% of the total during the first quarter
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Table 3.
DESEPAZ Program’s Information System in Cali, Colombia
The Development, Safety and Peace Program (Programa de Desarrollo, Seguridad y Paz), known by its Spanish
acronym as DESEPAZ, is an attempt to simultaneously address several risk factors which have been identified
as specific to the city of Cali, the DESEPAZ program is based upon a reliable information reporting system.
Since the program was launched in 1992, significant variation in crime statistics in the city of Cali were identi-
fied. Consequently, the Mayor set up a permanent working group which was made up of representatives of the
Metropolitan Police Force, the District Attorney’s Office (Fiscalía), the Forensic Medicine Institute (Instituto de
Medicina Legal), the Municipal Government Representative (Personería Municipal), and the Municipal Depart-
ments (Secretariats) of Traffic and Public Health. An epidemiologist served as coordinator, and the group began
to meet on a weekly basis in order to conduct a thorough review of all violent incidents that had occurred dur-
ing the previous week and prepare a report for the Municipal Council of Public Safety (Consejo Municipal de
Seguridad). One of the first tasks the group undertook was to come to an agreement on what variables would be
analyzed and how these variables would be defined from an operational standpoint. The result was almost total
consistency in the numbers generated by all sources of crime statistics which, prior to that time, had produced
widely divergent statistics.
The information reporting system has been a fundamental tool for the success of DESEPAZ in dealing with
crime in Cali. Subsequent administrations have kept the system in place. Thanks to the system, informed
citizens, along with the Universidad del Valle and the news media, have become effective monitors of the
evolution of crime in the city and judges of how the local government and police are handling the problem
of crime.
Because of the types of problems cited above, official
statistics often underestimate the true extent of the
problem. According to an official report produced by
the World Health Organization and the Pan American
Health Organization (WHO/PAHO) in 1997, El Salva-
dor posted a homicide rate of 39.9 per hundred thou-
sand inhabitants. But, after a careful study was
conducted comparing the different sources of informa-
tion, it was estimated that this rate was really 138.9 per
hundred thousand persons, or more than three times
higher than the official figure.
Some forms of violence are relatively easy to measure;
others, however, such as domestic violence, are more
complex and require special instruments and question-
naires that must be applied at the household level. If
something cannot be measured, it cannot be dealt with
or managed. Therefore, it is imperative to make an ef-
fort to measure even violence that is difficult to detect.
«Measure whatever you are able to measure, and what
you are unable to, you must make measurable», recom-
mended Galileo.4
Nota Técnica 1 Technical Note 8
effect on actual victimization rates (Chinchilla,
1998).
Based on the foregoing observations, it would be
reasonable to conclude that governments ought to not
only be concerned about lowering homicide rates, but
also ought to take actions to improve the climate of
insecurity. These actions could include, for example:
Effective campaigns against crimes that are most vis-
ible and most affect the public, such as muggings,
burglary and auto theft.
Increased police presence in neighborhoods and
communities, especially through community polic-
ing programs.
Wider use of criminal justice system and law en-
forcement operational methods that have proven to
be successful.
Examples of Local Government
Intervention
The following section offers several examples of
local government interventions that have proven to be
effective in tackling one or several risk factors. The va-
riety of actions taken makes it difficult to use a single
classification system and, therefore, three broad catego-
ries have been used to classify the examples: sector
(police, justice and education); risk factor (gun and




Even when statistics on violence are perfectly accurate,
significant gaps may exist between public perception of
violence and objective fact. Public perception, as ex-
pressed by public opinion surveys, is a different phe-
nomenon from actual incidence of violence, although it
can be correlated to objective statistics on the different
forms of violence. It is not unusual for governments to
take action to make streets safer as a result of pressure
from the public’s perception of a lack of public safety,
even when statistics suggest relatively low levels of
crime and violence.
Public perception may be at odds with objective levels
of violence for several reasons.
High frequency of certain forms of minor violence
(such as shoplifting, theft or burglary) generate
widespread feelings of insecurity, even when rates of
more serious crime, such as homicide, are not high.
This appears to be the case of Uruguay, where the
government, under heavy social pressure, took the
initiative to organize a public safety program that
included interpersonal violence and crime
prevention among its objectives. In reviewing crime
statistics for this country, it is apparent that
homicide rates in Uruguay are low in comparison to
other countries, but the frequency of minor crimes
such as burglary, although in relatively low terms,
has been rising over the past few years.
Excessive coverage of crime and violence in the
media creates a disproportionate feeling of danger
and lack of safety, which is known in English-
language literature as the «mean world syndrome»
(Prothrow-Stith, 1991). For example, in Santiago,
Chile, a city with comparatively low crime rates,
there is a widespread feeling that criminal violence
has entered a critical period of skyrocketing growth;
this perception is based on «a non-systematic view
of the facts, on which the mass media, peer groups
and personal experience -among other things- have
an influence» (Oviedo, 1994).
Public perception that the criminal justice system or
police forces are ineffective creates a climate of
impunity, which may result in a rise in crime over
the long term. Even in the short-run, however, a
climate of impunity generates an increased
perception of insecurity. The community policing
model recently implemented in Hatillo, Costa Rica,
has reduced feelings of insecurity and improved the
image of the policy, but it has had no significant5
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Table 4:
The New York City Example1
 Improved Policing. The police force and the criminal
justice system comprise the fundamental pillars of
law and order and public safety. Nevertheless, cer-
tain difficulties in improving police management and
administration have become apparent. Many police
departments are managed and financed by the na-
tional or federal government, which limits the con-
trol that a mayor or any other local authority has
over law enforcement activities. Furthermore, many
times a municipal police force and a national police
force may have overlapping or concurrent jurisdic-
tion within a single city, and the two forces may have
an adversarial relationship. In some countries, the
division between the scope of action of the army and
the police has not been clearly defined.
Many countries and cities have implemented police
reform programs. A particularly common type of re-
form has been the adoption of community policing
(see Technical Note 9). Even though no precise defi-
nition of community policing has been put forth, the
approach usually involves several common charac-
teristics, such as:
Emphasis on solving community problems and
not only serious crimes.
Interest not only in the commission of crimes but
also in antisocial behavior that precedes the
crimes.
A proactive rather than purely reactive approach.
Closer involvement and greater interest of police
in everyday affairs of the neighborhood.
Higher visibility in neighborhoods, foot and bi-
cycle patrols, and less time working in police sta-
tions.
Participatory style with delegated responsibilities
and individual discretion.
    In light of the community-focused nature of this
model, it is clear that local governments are in the
best position to successfully apply and effectively
monitor on this approach to policing.
    Another approach to policing that has been used in
different communities is based on the «broken win-
dow» theory. This approach focuses police efforts on
events that occur before crime is committed so that
policing takes on a preemptive function, which
stands in stark contrast to the traditional concept of
rapid response to crime as it is committed (Kelling
and Coles, 1996). The New York City Police, for ex-
ample, used this method to try to reduce crime on
the public subway system. The measures taken to
It is widely known that homicide rates fell by
around 68% and general violations of the law by
50% in New York City over the five-year period be-
ginning in 1993. This success was achieved as a re-
sult of a far-reaching reorganization of the police
department, which consisted of three major compo-
nents:
  Decentralization and delegating of functions to
the precinct level, which gave rise to creativity
and transferred responsibilities to districts and
precinct chiefs.
  A computerized, crime statistics system, called
Compstat, which provided instant access to real-
time mapping of the location of criminal events
throughout the city, thus enabling officers to find
out about anything from domestic violence com-
plaints to traffic accidents. The system also made
it possible to evaluate and monitor the perfor-
mance of district comanders.
  Focusing police efforts on specific problems and
breaking with the traditional «sweeps» or
«raids».
Police Commissioner Bratton applied Kelling’s prin-
ciples and the «broken window» theory, which he
was familiar with from his previous position in Bos-
ton. The officers focused successively on various
problems that had been identified, such as car radio
theft, conducting an in-depth study of each prob-
lem until a solution was found. The police targeted
their efforts toward control of prostitution, sale of
alcohol to minors, drug trafficking and noise pollu-
tion. An offensive was mounted against violators of
weapons possession laws who, after being placed
under arrest, were interrogated to find out from
where the guns had been obtained. People arrested
for other offenses were also interrogated as to the
source of weapons found in their possession. The
problem of drug distribution was tackled by reha-
bilitating specific neighborhoods, which involved
breaking up gangs on a neighborhood by neighbor-
hood basis2.
1 Bratton WJ, Andrews W, 1999. What we’ve learned about
   policing. City Journal. Summer 1999 pp. 14-27 New York, NY
2 Harnett PJ, Andrews W, How is New York winning the war   on
drugs. City Journal. Summer 1999 pp 29-37. New York NY6
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achieve this goal were to control illegal access to the
subway system by     teenagers, prevent alcohol use
on the subway, and eliminate graffiti on train cars.
    Despite New York City’s success in reducing crime,
the model employed by the police force has been
called into question because the stricter control
measures have led to a substantial increase in citizen
complaints against the police department
(See Note 9).
    At the same time the broken window theory was ap-
plied in New York, other communities in the United
States enjoyed similar success in crime-reduction by
using less drastic models. The most well known ex-
ample of this is the city of San Francisco, where
measures such as alternative sentencing and promo-
tion of community involvement in crime reduction
efforts were adopted. Despite claims that the city
was too soft on crime, San Francisco experienced a
47% drop in reported crime, which was comparable
to New York’s 46% decrease. Moreover, for some pe-
riods of time, the reduction in violent crime in San
Francisco was the largest among the ten largest cit-
ies in the United States.
 Improving the Criminal Justice System. One of the
main risk factors for violence is impunity resulting
from an overburdened, slow, and inefficient judicial
system, which many times is also corrupt and lacks
credibility. As a consequence of the loss of public
confidence in the ability of the courts to do justice,
a tendency to take justice in one’s own hands has
become common in many countries. This means
that disputes or conflicts are settled outside of the
law, generally by means of violence (McAlister et al.,
1999).
    In response to this situation, many governments
have: implemented programs to reform and improve
the administration of justice; increased the supply of
judicial services to bring the criminal justice system
closer to citizens; promoted alternative methods for
peaceful resolution of conflicts; and also increased
the effectiveness of punishment by improving the
prison system.
    It is worthwhile to mention the “Casas de Justicia”,
an experiment launched by the Colombian govern-
ment to bring the justice system closer to the citizen
and thus improve efficiency and public perception
of the courts. This program is of particular relevance
to this Note because execution at the municipal
level is a key component. As yet, no formal evalua-
tions of this experiment have been conducted; nev-
ertheless, an increase in the number of cases
handled by service providers has been reported.7
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Table 5.
“Casas de Justicia” in Colombia
In 1994, as part of the Program for the Improvement of the Administration of Justice (Programa para el
Mejoramiento de la Administración de Justicia), the Colombian Ministry of Justice conducted a pilot project in or-
der to facilitate access to the criminal justice system for communities with high levels of conflict, which were
generally located on the outskirts of cities. Under the program, two ‘Houses of Justice’ or Casas de Justicia, were
established in Aguablanca, Cali and Ciudad Bolivar, Bogota.
These judicial service centers represent an attempt by national and local governments to decentralize the orga-
nization and administration of the criminal justice system. This has been achieved by locating the institutions
that provide judicial services at single physical site. In Colombia these institutions are:
 District Attorney’s Office (Fiscalía): to deal on the community level with prosecutable crimes;
 Family Violence Intake Centers and Victim Assistance Offices (Comisaría and Defensoría de Familia): to deal
with cases of intrafamily violence, child abuse and discrimination against women;
 Forensic Medicine: to provide technical support to institutions that need legal medical certification.
 Ministry of the Public Prosecutor (Ministerio Públicoˆ): Attorney General’s Office (Procuraduría General de la
Nación,), which oversees performance and accountability of the judiciary and public officials; Office of the Om-
budsman (Defensoría del Pueblo); and the Office of the Municipal Representative (Personería Municipal). The job of
these three offices is to protect human rights and safeguard the interests of the community at large;
 Police Oversight Office (Inspección de Policía): civilian agencies which are part of municipal government of-
fices (secretarías) in Colombia, where citizens file complaints; they also serve as outreach centers for com-
munity-based public safety and peaceful coexistence programs;
 Legal Aid Agencies (Consultorios Jurídicos) and Mediation and Arbitration Centers (Centros de Conciliación y
Arbitraje): These agencies provide legal aid to citizens; they also have the legal authority to use alternative meth-
ods for conflict or dispute resolution (mediation or out-of-court settlements) or to bring a case to court.
The generic model of these houses of justice is flexible; not all services are provided at every one of the locations.
The model requires some local adaptations to achieve best results, but results to date have been encouraging.
 Education: A Culture of Non-Violence. Violent re-
sponse to conflict is a learned behavior (Slaby et al.,
1995). In all societies, prevailing moral and ethical
norms determine how people react to conflict,
which makes these tacit rules of behavior very im-
portant factors in controlling violence.
    A variety of attempts have been made to modify be-
havior through community-based education pro-
grams that preach tolerance, such as the above-cited
DESEPAZ program, or school-based programs such
as the PALS program in Jamaica, which utilized the
Foundation for Peace Education model. This model
seeks to educate children, teens and adults about
the dynamics of conflict resolution and methods





Suspension/Detention from school (and taking
advantage of the time that students are sus-
pended from school or serving detention for vio-
lent acts they have committed)
Bus Driver Involvement: training bus drivers to
aid in the education process, since the driver is
the first and last person that many children see
every day before and after school.
More complete information on this model is avail-
able at http://www.peace-ed.org/curricula/
Bogota Mayor Mockus’ 1995-1998 “Cultura
Ciudadana” program proved to be an interesting ex-
periment in behavioral modification through culture
(Mockus, 1999). This program was an attempt at
bolstering cultural -as opposed to traditional legal-
regulation of citizen behavior in settings such as8
Nota Técnica 1 Technical Note 8
Table 7.
Violent Deaths in Bogota
Firts Half of 1995-1996
1995                 1996             % change
Homicides  1778 1699 –4.5
Traffic Accidents    681   648 –4.9
Other Accidents    362   328 –9.4
Suicides    138   126 –8.7
Total  2959 2801 –5.4
Source: Instituto Médico Legal, 1997
public spaces, public transportation facilities, and
public events. During this period, a voluntary disar-
mament program of the civilian population and re-
strictions on alcoholic beverage sales in stores were
put into place. Over the course of these three years,
the efforts of the Mayor’s Office paid off, as the an-
nual homicide rate dropped from 72 deaths per
100,000 inhabitants in 1994 to 51 deaths per
100,000 inhabitants in 1997. A decrease in the rate
of violent deaths resulting from traffic accidents was
also posted over the same period, falling from 25
deaths per 100,000 people to 20 per 100,000. Addi-
tionally, the number of children injured by fireworks
related incidents fell by more than two thirds as a
result of a ban on their manufacture, sale and use.
 Sale of Alcoholic Beverages. It is a well known fact
that alcohol consumption causes significant meta-
bolic changes in the human body, particularly in
some neurotransmitters that are involved in violent
behavior (Phil and Peterson, 1993). It is also a fact
that excessive alcohol consumption is associated
with almost every single form of violence, especially
when consumption is episodic and takes place in
certain cultural settings. The conclusions of selected
studies on the subject are listed below (Parker,
1993).
Londoño found a significant correlation between
the incidence of alcoholism and homicide rates in
several regions of the world (Londoño, 1996).
Coleman and Straus found that incidence of vio-
lence against women was 15 times higher in
homes where the husband suffers from alcohol-
ism (Colemen and Straus, 1983).
A compilation of five studies on homicide
showed that between 47% and 68% of the vic-
tims had consumed alcoholic beverages
(Pernanen, 1995) and other studies have shown
high levels of alcohol consumption among assail-
ants and victimizers (Murdoch et al., 1990).
Statistics from the DESEPAZ program in Cali, Co-
lombia show that 56% of all homicides take place
on one of the three days of the weekend and that
one fourth of these homicides occur on Sunday.
Moreover, a disproportionate increase in homi-
cides takes place on special celebrations or holi-
days such as Mother’s Day, Christmas time, New
Years Eve, celebrations for sports victories, etc.
(Concha et al., 1994)
Based on the above-cited statistics, it is safe to say
that restrictions on the sale of alcoholic beverages in
public places is an effective measure in reducing
crime and accidents. The «semi-dry» (ley semi-seca)
laws of Cali or the so-called «carrot law» of Bogota
(ley zanahoria), which established a “curfew” (be-
tween 1:00 and 2:00 AM) for the sale of alcohol,
made a considerable difference in reducing violence
in these cities (Instituto Médico Legal, 1997). The
table below shows how violent death rates changed
between 1995, when alcoholic beverage sale restric-
tions were not in effect, and 1996, when the mea-
sure came into effect.
 Gun Control. Several studies have made it possible
to identify the proliferation of guns as a risk factor
for violence, especially because these weapons make
aggression more lethal. Consequently, placing re-
strictions on the sale and possession of guns is an ef-
fective measure for curbing violence (Sloan et al.,
1988).
It has been shown that possession of a gun in a
household increases the risk of death for family
members by 2.7%  (Kellerman et al., 1993).
A study conducted by the Carter Center showed
that 80% of all homicides committed by teens in
the United States are perpetrated with guns.
According to the Colombian Institute of Forensic
Medicine, 80% of all homicides in that country in
1994 were committed with guns (Mora et al.,
1994). In Rio de Janeiro, this figure was 82% for
1993 (Der Ghousgassian and Piguet-Carneiro,
1998).9
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Are Disarmament Programs Effective?
The results of studies on the effects of programs designed to achieve disarmament of the civilian population
and disarmament in post conflict situations have not been conclusive. Therefore, a more in-depth analysis of
the specifics of successful programs of this type, such as those that are listed below, need to be conducted:
In Cali, under the Guerrero Administration (1992-94) and in Bogota, during the Mockus administration
(1995-1998), possession of firearms was restricted for the civilian population. A recent evaluation of the
two cities revealed a reduction of nearly 14% in the homicide rate in both cities, as a result of the mea-
sures  (Villaveces and Cummings, 2000).
In Kansas City, United States, a significant drop in the number of homicides was recorded in one
sector of the city where authorities conducted a disarmament program targeting illegal gun owners. The
results were compared to a similar sector of the city, where no disarmament program was carried out,
and the experiment results bolstered the theory that gun control reduces violence (Sherman et al.,
1995).
Other experiments yielded far less encouraging results:
In Seattle, United States, an attempt was made to buy back guns that were in the hands of the civilian
population. Although more than one thousand guns were collected under the program, no statistically
significant reduction in crime and injuries was produced (Callahan et al., 1994).
In El Salvador, it is estimated that only 10% of the 200,000 guns distributed during the civil war were
collected and destroyed by the disarmament program that was implemented with the collaboration of
the United Nations. The wide availability of guns in El Salvador continues to have an adverse effect on
crime rates even though the internal conflict has come to an end (Pike, 1999).
 Focusing on High-Risk Groups. Local and city gov-
ernments have targeted violence-reduction efforts to-
wards these populations by setting up specialized
assistance centers and facilitating coordination and
involvement of existing groups in order to ensure
that comprehensive assistance is provided. In some
instances, local government acts as the direct pro-
gram executing agent, while in other instances, mu-
nicipal governments simply function as a
coordinating entity.
Violence against Women: Managing
Domestic Violence on the Municipal Level
The “Centro de Atención y Prevención en Violencia
Doméstica”  or ‘Center for Domestic Violence Assistance
and Prevention’ created by the Municipality of
Santiago, Chile is an interesting example of municipal
government intervention in the area domestic violence.
From its start, in early 1990, the center has evolved
from being called the Centro de Atención a Mujeres
Golpeadas or ‘Center for the Assistance of Battered
Women’ to its present title, which as the name implies,
not only focuses on women but also deals with preven-
tion. Prevention efforts target high-risk groups in
Santiago. The Municipality has put together a manual
that describes the municipal assistance model in detail
(Municipalidad de Santiago, 1998).10
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Chart 8. The mayors of the communities of Guamayen and
Maipu in Mendoza, Argentina, have successfully spear-
headed the creation of assistance and prevention net-
works and coordination between the different agencies
involved in domestic violence cases: police, health clin-
ics, specialized assistance centers, prosecutors, etc. The
weekly meeting of the Commission for the Prevention
of Violence, which is chaired by the mayors, has made
it possible to create a unified registry of statistics and
conduct ongoing follow up of families in the commu-
nity that have been affected by violence.
Dealing with Youth Violence
on the Local Level
Teen violence is a complex topic; therefore, a wide vari-
ety of risk factors must be addressed in order to prop-
erly deal with the phenomenon. Some programs in this
field have been aimed at:
developing self-esteem among teens; one such pro-
gram is in the slums of Trinidad and Tobago (Moser;
1999);
reducing school drop out rates, such as in the Bolsa-
Escola program in Brasilia (Veja, 1997);
generating employment opportunities for youth
through microenterprises and involving a caring
adult who can develop a stable emotional relation-
ship with teens, such as in the DESEPAZ program in
Cali, Colombia;3
establishing school-based conflict resolution pro-
grams, such as the PALS program in Jamaica.
It is useful to look at efforts led by the Mayor of Boston,
United States, as a successful example of deeply-rooted
community-based, comprehensive program designed to
reduce teen violence at the municipal level (U.S. De-
partment of Justice, 1996). Even though the Mayor’s
leadership was key to the success of the program, it is
also important to note that many different people and
institutions were involved in the process (See box bel-
low). As a general rule of thumb, it can be stated the
most successful programs tackle several risk factors at
the same time.
The Model Adopted by the City of Boston
The model followed by the city of Boston included
several law enforcement measures, such as gun con-
trol and gang control; at the same time, however,
prevention measures were also put in place, which
involved heavy community participation. For ex-
ample, a group of police officers, religious leaders,
parents, school officials, representatives of the dis-
trict attorney’s office, and social workers who work
with teens, would meet on a weekly basis to study
the particular cases of gang members (Mogul, 1999).
In 1990, a total of 152 homicides were committed in
the city of Boston; in prior years, the average was be-
low 100. In 1998, however, only 35 homicides were
committed in the city Gun-related injuries dropped
by 65%, and injuries involving other weapons de-
creased by 40%. According to those who ran the
program, several factors account for the success of
the program:
A comprehensive approach combining selective
and swift punishment for violators and, at the
same time, prevention measures for potential vio-
lators who have not broken the law yet.
Close coordination between police and federal,
state and local justice systems.
Collaboration between the police departments,
justice system and community organizations.
Leadership of religious organizations, which is es-
pecially useful for the Latino and African-Ameri-
can communities.
Support of the community in general, which
helped to generate employment opportunities for
these teens.
Organized communities whose residents get in-
volved and mobilize in response to the first signs
of danger.
Interaction of teens with adults who listen and act
as role models.
Firm mayoral leadership, which encouraged
people and organizations to take the necessary
steps to successfully implement the program,
even when doing so was risky, and helped to
bring about institutional coordination.
  3 The DESEPAZ program included a program activity called
PARCES, in which an adult would help make an emotional
connection with teens and facilitate adaptation to the real





A more comprehensive listing of Municipal Violence Preven-
tion and Assistance Programs can be found at:
www.iadb.org/sds/violence
A summary of successful practices compiled by the Interna-
tional Center for Crime Prevention can be found at: -preven-
tion-intl.org www.crime-prevention-intl.org
The experiences mentioned above show that it is pos-
sible to accomplish something on the local level in
solving the problems of violence and the lack of public
safety. The political will of mayors and local govern-
ment leaders and the mobilization of the entire com-
munity in support of proposed interventions is
required in order to solve these problems. Some risk
factors are relatively easy to address; whereas other risk
factors, more structural in nature, are much more com-
plex. Measures such as restricting the sale of alcoholic
beverages at certain times and days or banning posses-
sion of firearms have a significant but limited impact
because they only have a bearing upon a few risk fac-
tors. Nevertheless, these measures are important be-
cause they show that it is possible to do something on
the local level, in addition, the bolster public support
for other measures whose effects are slower in appearing.
No single formula or recipe is applicable to every place.
Each particular city and country should begin by as-
sessing their own situation and identifying the specific
factors that precipitate violence in their particular area
of the world in order to take effective action. The recent
experiment of applying mandatory seat belt buckling
laws in Colombia is a case in point, since the effect of
this law on the death rate from traffic accidents has
been negligible. Available statistics show that two
thirds of all homicides caused by traffic accidents in
Colombia are the result of pedestrians being hit by cars,
unlike other countries of world where most accident
victims are passengers in vehicles. In light of this fact, it
was not surprising that this law did not make a major
difference.
One particularly important problem is the lack of con-
tinuity of policies as government administrations come
in and out of office. This is a problem that is difficult to
solve, since it is common practice for newly elected
government officials to establish new programs and re-
ject the actions of prior administrations as inadequate.
Perhaps the best way of ensuring continuity is by em-
powering the community with regard to the problem
and policies adopted by governments. Reliable statistics
on variations in crime rates must be accessible and
available to all organized groups (universities, cham-
bers of commerce and industry, unions, NGO’s). These
statistics can help turn these organizations into pres-
sure groups, which is the best guarantee of continuity.
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